In this paper we examine the network relationships of a set of large retail multinational enterprises (MNEs). We analyze under what conditions a flagshipnetwork strategy (characterized by a network of five partners -the MNE; key suppliers; key partners; selected competitors; and key organisations in the nonbusiness infrastructure) explains the internationalisation of three retailers whose geographic scope, sectoral conditions and competitive strategies differ substantially.
INTRODUCTION
It is well known that the retail industry is one of the least internationalised among leading economic sectors. Indeed, in 2000, the world's top twenty retailers held no more than 26% of their assets overseas. In contrast, foreign assets accounted for 78% of tobacco manufacturers' total assets, 50% of chemical multinationals' total assets, and 40% of pharmaceutical companies' total assets 1 . This reflects the highly specific constraints on the transfer of retailers' capabilities across national borders. These constraints persist in spite of the opportunities offered to retailers for internationalisation by increasing regional economic integration in North America, Europe and Asia 2 . Slow sectoral internationalisation coupled with the recent remarkable international achievements of a few retailers has renewed interest in international retailing 3 .
In retailing, sometimes more than in manufacturing, internationalisation is not risk free, as the frequently discussed troubles of Wal-Mart and Toys R Us in Europe, Royal Ahold in the United States, and Carrefour in China have highlighted 4 . Retailers have two major strategic choices in internationalisation. First, they can transfer their resources by creating a proprietary network of foreign subsidiaries, i.e. through foreign direct investment (FDI). This strategy involves either greenfield development strategies (the firm sets up its operations from scratch), or acquisitions of existing local players or a combination of both. In this article we call this an internalisation strategy 5 . Alternatively, to limit their capital and physical exposure, retailers can internationalise by building networks with local and regional partners, such as key suppliers, key retail partners, key competitors and non-business infrastructure organisations that perform different value added activities in partnership with the retailer. We call this alternative a flagship-network strategy 6 . Here, we focus on the latter.
Our research takes an exploratory case study approach to investigate to what extent and in which circumstances retailers will rely on a flagship strategy to overcome their resource and capability transfer limits, to reduce their liability of foreignness, and to sustain internationalisation 7 . The cases investigated are Tesco, Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton (LVMH) and The Body Shop, selected for their important strategy positioning and sectoral differences.
Across the three retailers we find evidence of successful internationalisation correlated with the implementation of a flagship strategy. Yet they embrace a flagship strategy in different degrees and for different reasons. These differences depend on the transferability of their resources and capabilities and on their use of countryspecific advantages (CSAs). We find that, contingent on these dimensions, a flagship strategy based on long-term collaboration and learning with network partners is the best strategy to overcome internal and/or environmental constraints to cross-border resource transfers, which are barriers to FDI. We highlight the managerial implications of these findings.
THE FLAGSHIP SRATEGY
We investigate when and why retailers will opt for a flagship internationalisation strategy. We propose that MNEs facing internal and environmental constraints to their internationalisation-i.e. some limits to the transfer of their competencies across border-are better off entering certain foreign markets by building networks of local and regional key partners than by adopting a go-it-alone FDI strategy. Among the multiple "network" configurations described in the literature, the flagship strategy alone highlights the benefits of a corporate-planned, long-term based internationalisation strategy which involves one central multinational and a web of selected partners. In contrast with many studies which highlight bilateral relationships in retailing 8 , the flagship goes a step further by enabling firms to leverage multidirectional network effects. The flagship MNE provides the strategic vision and coordination to lead the network through successful international expansion. All five partners interact freely and openly with each other and the complementarities of skills necessary to improve the overall network performance are coordinated by the flagship through a multidirectional information flow. Although the upstream and downstream partners, the key distributors and the key suppliers relinquish strategic direction to the flagship (strategic asymmetry), they gain additional decentralised value-added activities of their own. All relationships are long-term and knowledge-sharing agreements. Key partners specialize in achieving commonly agreed tasks. Relationships with key suppliers rely on international benchmarking rather than on competitive tendering.
All these traits make the flagship strategy quite distinct from other network strategies in the literature. While some network studies focus on social relations between individuals and organisations but without any specific strategic intent and others have a strategic management purpose, few address international business issues. To recognize the contribution of flagship strategy to the international management field, it is important to differentiate the flagship framework from multiple and heterogeneous definitions of networks. Table 1 which contrasts these different views with the flagship, sociological accounts of networks either emphasise the network landscape in which firms are broadly embedded (see Nohria's work for instance 9 ), or interpersonal networks where the structure and the nature of ties between individuals is the object of study (see for example Burt's or Krackhardt's developments 10 ). These views have only indirectly emphasised the benefits of networks for firms' innovation, competitive advantage creation, and learning.
As underscored in
In contrast, the strategic management stream to which the flagship strategy belongs emphasises strategic networks geared toward innovation, flexibility, learning, and capability development. This work models firms as internal networks, such as the and peripheral firms such that they emphasise power rivalries between different subnetworks. In the flagship strategy, however, no partner is the rival of the others, which limits political clashes. The flagship strategy is also distinct from typologies of locally based clusters of cooperative firms (Porter) which can also cooperate across geographic boundaries (Nachum and Keeble) but which are analyzed at an aggregated industry level, and therefore make the benefits for each firm difficult to disentangle 16 .
In addition to its specific focus on MNEs' strategy, a flagship strategy presents two other distinct features. First, the flagship network relies on 'strategic asymmetry' between the flagship MNE and its partners. Strategic asymmetry is the network's key governance mechanism to curb the risk of opportunism incurred by coordination outside the hierarchy. While most studies emphasise the common participation of all partners to strategy, in the flagship strategy, independent partners relinquish the strategic leadership of the network to the central MNE for those activities relevant to the network's scope. Indeed, strategic asymmetry increases the network stability through shared inter-organisational purpose based on a constant agreement on a well-defined strategic agenda. If all partners participated in strategy formulation, competing objectives between partners would undermine trust and shared purpose. It also helps the development of a 'common language' necessary to inter-organisational learning. The flagship is the coordinator/facilitator of learning.
Second, the flagship strategy is based on consistent multilateral and multidirectional partnerships. Where other studies consider one or two types of partners at a time (vertical or horizontal), the flagship strategy stands on the interactions of all key business partners. The flagship strategy is also distinct by the important role it attributes to non-business infrastructures.
Overall, the flagship strategy presents unique configuration traits which can help MNEs to internationalise more effectively and efficiently when they lack transferable resources to do so, or when they face high environmental pressures in host markets. When FDI is risky and difficult, MNEs are advised to coordinate a web of key partners in which they act as the strategic centre.
Before we turn to the case analysis to determine whether these privileged links exist in retail and why, we now introduce the rationale of our case selection and of our research methodology. are global with significant sales in the three regions of the triad 22 . More specifically, the extent to which a firm crosses the boundaries of its home-region appears to increase the necessity to adapt to different market and institutional conditions, (as so few large MNEs achieve some global activity). Tesco is very home-region oriented (92% of its sales were derived from Europe and 8% from Asia in 2002). TBS is also home-region oriented with 53% of its sales in Europe, but it has significant operations in the two other regions of the triad (22% in Asia Pacific and 25% in the Americas).
LVMH is truly global (34% of its sales in Europe, 27% in the United States and 30%
in Asia Pacific).
Finally, several sectoral and environmental factors help determine the conditions of cross-border transfer of retail firms' capabilities. In the grocery retail segment, national taste; cultural, religious and shopping pattern variations; local planning regulations; and the perishability of products impose constraints 23 . These constraints apply to Tesco. In the luxury retail segment, cross-border differences for elitist products and brands are minimal as the same sort of products appeal to the global jet set 24 . This different set of environmental conditions applies to LVMH and affects its internationalisation strategy. In the cosmetic segment there are some consumer taste differences and distributional complexities caused by rising cosmetic market-share of competing General Merchandise Stores (GMS). Such environmental constraints apply to TBS.
The main differences across the three selected firms, susceptible of triggering different causes of flagship network inception, are summarized in Table 2 . 25 . To help reduce any retrospective bias and control for the bias present in the interviewer-interviewee relationship 26 we triangulated the different interviews with one another across the network and also with both internal and secondary sources. This method generated a rich multi-faceted view of the phenomenon.
THE THREE CASES
In this section, we explore two research questions. First, we consider evidence for the existence of flagship network strategies and of their correlation with the three retailers' international success. Second, we examine whether different factors explain their network strategies.
i) Evidence of different levels of flagship-network relations across the three retailers
As summarized in Table 3 , the careful selection of cases led to the observation of interesting differences in the degree of flagship network strategies coordinated by the three retailers. But according to the retailers, the flagship strategy significantly contributes to their current international success.
Tesco, the leading British GMS retailer has been the least flagship-oriented of the three cases but it increasingly relies on this strategy. In Europe, it has used an FDI internalisation strategy to enter Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, and Ireland. In Asia, for reasons detailed below, Tesco has increasingly relied on partners (joint-ventures) and in the UK it has successfully diversified its formats and services with key partners. The estimated proportion of revenues generated by these joint activities increased from 3. The nature of these relatively new relationships, summarized in Table 3 considers that LVMH's strategy is often portrayed as relying exclusively on a wholly integrated distribution network 27 . Upstream, LVMH has reduced its reliance on a handful of critical key franchisees which cleverly complement the product offering.
Like Tesco, LVMH has no alliance or networking relationships with direct competitors except through the Comité Colbert, an association which promotes
French luxury houses' interests in the world. However, the group has recently started a JV with DeBeers for the retail distribution of diamonds. Finally, LVMH actively relies on several non-business infrastructures to improve its international competitiveness (see Table 3 As developed in the next section, these differences in the degree of flagship strategy are explained by diverging causes of flagship network inception. The following analysis also helps us to identify converging patterns of flagship relations across the retailers which confirm that they follow a flagship strategy, but also traits which diverge from the "ideal" flagship strategy, indicating retailing specificities. The data also show that these institutional sources of network orientation are in fact subordinated to the economic context of transactions. For example, Tesco is careful to foresee the institutional stability that will sustain its contractual relations in the alliances before deciding to enter some countries through alliances. Tesco carefully monitors other competitors' entry strategies in so-called risky countries. In China, where the joint venture is the entry mode-must, Carrefour's 2001 troubles have made Tesco cautious to enter this market, where it is still absent today. Even if it is public knowledge that Tesco will soon enter China, it has taken much more time to check the situation there and establish the safeguards that will minimize its transaction risks.
As summarized in Table 4 , Tesco's flagship approach is based on strategic asymmetry and synergies throughout the network. Downstream and NBI partners help to raise its legitimacy in host markets, which convince governments and suppliers of its serious economic intentions. This leads to more efficient supply-chain relationships and more store opening authorizations which foster Tesco', Samsung' and their suppliers' revenues. Here, exogenous, societal and institutional barriers to internationalisation play the main role in explaining this flagship strategy.
LVMH
As shown above, LVMH sustains its global leadership and differentiation strategy partially through network ties that selectively complement its internalised strategy. In this section, we find other types of internationalisation challenges which explain these ties. We also show why, once coordinated, these ties create a flagship network.
In contrast to Tesco, LVMH relies much more on external partners. LVMH presents significant evidence of a flagship strategy with multiple synergies and strategic asymmetry. This strategy is mostly explained by capabilities and resource development barriers to internationalisation combined with opportunism minimization concerns (see Table 4 ). Win-win exchanges explain the long-standing and quality aspect of these relationships. This is also why the number of these partners must be limited to be properly managed.
THE BODY SHOP
In contrast with Tesco and most retailers, TBS pioneered and built its reputation on corporate social responsibility (CSR). CSR was not an exogenous pressure which drove legitimate expansion overseas or at home. It was an internal strategic choice directed by its founder who had a new vision of doing business. In contrast with LVMH, whose products could generate up to 48% of operating margin, TBS never had the resources to build a costly network of concessions within department stores or to invest in advertising in the three markets of the triad. TBS illustrates how a modest niche retailer can achieve a high international profile by building flagship ties with a number of key partners, while imposing what is now a norm to succeed in the retail industry: CSR. It is because the evidence shows that the network is closely articulated and multilateral that we call it a flagship. But we found that TBS flagship-based expansion has been mainly internally driven. Internationalisation has sharpened internal governance choices between internalising and de-internalising, which the flagship strategy has helped to solve, while also meeting TBS's founders' ideals of entrepreneurship and ethical trade.
To internationalise, TBS opted for a full flagship strategy after considering that it would be more economically efficient to rely on long-term relationships based on trust with key partners rather than (fully) vertically integrate. This trade-off includes multiple elements. As TBS retail director put it for downstream operations:
'The main risk TBS has to evaluate is to induce franchisees to invest regularly into the network to keep the pace of innovation and competition. Another challenge we take into account is the overdevelopment by some head franchisees in some countries where the network is close to saturation, with some risks of overexposure of the brand and even internal cannibalization. This can lead us to buy-out a franchisee, which is a hidden cost of trust[…] On the benefit side, we assess that key partners provide excellent leadership for the brand. They have high profile and exposure in local political life. They are high impact people, which is always good to promote the business. They also are influential in the press.'
In 2000, to show further commitment and enhance trust by increasing responsiveness to franchisees TBS changed structure. It has created regional headquarters. These centralize supply chain management and decentralize operations from the headquarters to shorten lead-times of new product introduction. They also enhance multidirectional feedback communications between franchisees, TBS and its suppliers, to the benefit of the overall network. Thus, this new structure which balances centralisation and decentralisation helps it to strengthen its strategic leadership between network partners.
The new structure is also meant to solve the internal governance tensions which had gradually developed in the 1990s. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the weight of the U.S. division had gradually risen to the point of causing inefficiencies and management inconsistencies between the U.S. subsidiary and the headquarters. For example, it resulted in the proliferation of the number of suppliers and in costly overlapping capacities. TBS also chose a flagship strategy for the network synergies which help it to sustain its CSR leading profile. TBS has pioneered fair trade by asking its suppliers to source raw ingredients from forty-two trading business communities in the developing world. However, the company also needs to be market-responsive and to (ii) Direct alliances with competitors are rare. Alliances take place with other small or large multinationals, specialized in specific services. They facilitate diversification but avoid domain overlaps. Thus, this research confirms previous studies on the extreme competitiveness and anti-cooperative attitude in retailing, especially in the grocery segment 30 . At the same time, it contributes to contextualise the original flagship strategy framework.
LINKING FLAGSHIP THEORY TO THE FSA/CSA MATRIX
The previous section shows that when network-based strategies are chosen by retailers to internationalise, they emerge for different reasons. In this section, we go The resulting Figure 2 is an international strategy matrix. We will now position the three firms in this matrix based on our interviews and analysis. However, our strategic positioning, dealing with the international aspects of the FSAs, and with CSAs, should not be confused with positioning using financial performance measures. The latter are reviewed in Table 5 . This shows that Tesco leads in most overall performance categories, but we have found that it has had relatively more difficulties to transfer its FSAs internationally than the two other retailers, as we now discuss.
When starting up in a foreign country and the more remote this country is (for instance the Asian countries), Tesco does not enter with a well-known brand name which places it at an advantage with local competitors. Its liability of foreignness is high and it needs to adapt considerably its marketing and different elements of its value-chain to local conditions. The conditions of resource transferability from the home-to the host markets are difficult. For these reasons, the geographic reach of Clearly, TBS has strong non location-bound FSAs, especially marketing-based.
However, unlike LVMH with France, TBS does not rely on a 'made in the U.K.'
advantage. Unlike Tesco whose 82% of sales are generated in the U.K., TBS homecountry accounted for no more than 39%. In other words, TBS had weak CSAs. TBS is placed in quadrant 4 of Figure 2 matrix. Thus, to compensate for this weakness, TBS has to strengthen the global reach of the FSA, e.g. its marketing advantages, while placing a special emphasis on its cost control. It can do so by adopting a focused strategy based on network interactions. Therefore, the factors that matter are firm-based (high in FSA and low in CSA).
FIGURE 2 here
In addition to the new links established between the two strategic frameworks and the evidence of some weak flagship by contrast with the "ideal" flagship strategy framework, we find that the contingencies explaining flagship network inception have clear identifiable roots in the general management, organisation theory, strategic management and international business literatures. Indeed, these contingencies are clearly rooted in transaction costs economics, institutional theory, and the resourcebased view of the firm. Thus, research in retailing is perfectly compatible with these theories, contrary to what certain retail scholars argue 32 . The analytical lenses used in this paper and the contributions to the academic literature are synthesized in Table 6 .
TABLES 5 and 6 here STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
Bearing in mind the small number of cases studied, which is a possible limitation to this research, we now turn to the main managerial implications of the findings. We draw recommendations for both flagship MNE managers and network partner managers. First, when its brand name is unknown abroad (weak FSA) but when it has strong leadership in its home-market (strong CSAs, quadrant 1 situation), the retailer will predominantly choose a flagship strategy if it needs to develop a high profile and adapt its value chain to institutional contingencies (economic, legal, isomorphic). If this is the case, active cooperation with suppliers and non-business institutions such as host governments and trade associations will be crucial to becoming nationally responsive and economically efficient. In contrast, an internalised strategy is needed when contracts and property right enforcement regimes are too weak to control for external opportunism.
Second, when a retailer's brand name and CSAs are both strong, i.e. when it has a quadrant 3 mix, the retailer is indifferent between an internalised or a deinternalised strategy. The retailer can choose or adopt both. But if it aims to become global, as opposed to staying regional or local, it will hardly achieve sourcing or distribution economies of scale on a 'go-it-alone' basis. Therefore, the retailer will opt for a flagship mainly to complement rather than substitute for its internal growth.
This choice will be led by some strategic factors: avoid key knowledge leakage, and reduce the risks or capital exposure by leveraging external parties' capabilities and resources if some complementarities and interdependencies with existing players are worth pursuing. In crafting this flagship strategy, the decision-maker will mostly concentrate efforts on partners that enhance the retail network scale (downstream partners).
Third, when the retailer starts internationalising with modest CSAs, its purpose will be to compensate this weakness by developing stronger FSAs such as excellent marketing skills. In this quadrant 4 situation, it will likely opt for a flagship strategy if the trade-off between an internalised expansion through M&A or organic growth (which requires not only high resources but also favourable incentives and asset complementarities 33 ) and the costs incurred to build trust with possible partners leans in favour of the latter. When it is cheaper to build trust, the manager will evaluate which resources and which partners to prioritize.
(ii) In the flagship network, create synergies between all key partners. This point is essential to create trust since it is by facilitating synergistic benefits that flagship MNE managers show and stimulate commitment to and from all partners. In assessing which kind of partners the firm should prioritize, the retailer should be careful to avoid two pitfalls. First, it should avoid excessive alliances. These networks are carefully built over time and going too fast makes the whole construction fragile.
The three case studies demonstrated that the number of key partners must be very Perhaps other GMS retailers will move from quadrant 1 to quadrant 3 and internationalise further, for instance by becoming at least bi-regional actors. As their international life-cycle matures, they will need partners more for strategic than institutional reasons, which was a cycle experienced by LVMH in the late 1980s to the early 1990s. As their brands and operational practices become more familiar, they will face fewer institutional pressures. It is striking that Tesco is still at an early stage of its internationalisation compared to LVMH and TBS. The implication is that there are life-cycle dynamics underlying a flagship strategy and the manager ought to be alert to changing operational conditions with the passage of time.
These managerial implications are synthesized in Table 7.   TABLE 7 here
CONCLUSIONS
The study has highlighted the value of the flagship strategy to overcome firm-specific and exogenous barriers to internationalisation. In so doing, it supports a growing body of international business literature emphasizing the gradual opening of MNEs' boundaries across borders with an increasing network-form of organisation and structure. 34 Traditionally, the literature has emphasised the role of trust to enter cooperative relationships. Our research suggests that trust often comes second to contracts. Good relationships will necessarily evolve beyond contracts but managers should not be afraid to develop contracts.
Second, since there is a constant trade-off between endogenous and exogenous pressures on a retailer, we do not suggest that flagship strategy is a universal panacea. Indeed, we note several associated risks. One risk is complacency.
Flagship MNEs cannot tolerate inter-partner complacency and when they fall into this trap (which was the case to some extent at TBS in the late 1990s before their restructuring), they risk failure. The flagship MNE provides guidance, assistance, long-term vision and business stability for its partners to invest and improve their skills. These partners must be prepared to face pressure on their route to excellence 
KEY FINDINGS
• The flagship strategy is a viable strategy of internationalisation and foreign operations management for multinational retailers. This confirms previous studies on the current trend in boundaries opening among multinational enterprises.
• However, in contrast with the "ideal" flagship strategy framework, the specificities of this industry lead to uncover weak flagship relations. This makes the framework more contextual.
• The FSA/CSA international management framework is found to be useful to explain the causes of flagship network inceptions. The causes of network inception are not serendipitous. This has important managerial implications for the trade-off between a choice of internalisation or partnership strategies.
• Contrary to what is sometimes read in the academic literature on retailing, the analysis confirms the relevance of several main stream theories to explain network inceptions: these theories are transaction costs economics, the resource-based view of the firm, institutional and contingency theories.
• Contingency and institutional factors where not present in Rugman and D'Cruz's flagship framework. This research shows that the sources of theories which underpin flagship networks can be usefully enlarged.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
• This research is exploratory only. Larger scale confirmatory research needed within the three retail segments studied to check the consistency of patterns of flagship network inception as predicted by the FSA/CSA framework.
• If larger scale studies identify clusters of retailers with similar FSA/CSA configurations, will we find the same degree of reliance on flagship network strategy? This research is based on an assumption of managerial intentionality seeking economic efficiency maximisation. Theory explains that other rationales explain managerial behaviour. So which other factors will explain the differences: path-dependency, internal politics, opportunity, etc.?
TABLE 7 -LESSONS FOR MANAGERS
• In addition to being a useful strategy to manage long-term network cooperation, the flagship strategy is useful to overcome different internal and exogenous barriers to internationalisation.
For flagship MNE managers
• Choose your internationalisation strategy (trade off between internalisation and de-internalisation) in function of your initial competitive position (determined by the FSA/CSA combination).
• Consider contracting; although they are not compulsory, good relationships can be managed contractually at first; with time you will make them evolve to fully trust-based relationships. We find that contracts are an important first step towards trust creation.
• Create trust by showing commitments to all network partners and by constructing effective network synergies for the benefit of all partners.
• Select a very limited number of partners. The flagship MNE cannot disperse its time and energy in supervising and providing impetus to a host of partners.
• Select your partners on the basis of the complementarities they offer to the flagship and on the complementarities and synergies that they can build with one another.
• Do not confound strategic asymmetry with tyranny: remain open to sharing of ideas and prospects; they are source of opportunities for innovation.
• Don't forget non-business infrastructures
• Anticipate the risks: avoid complacency, don't remain locked into undesirable strategic positions; renew or enlarge the network. With the passage of time, as your FSA evolve, you will need new partners matching your new requirements.
For other network partner managers
• Constantly improve and renew your capabilities.
• Be proactive towards the flagship MNE and towards the other network members 
